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The Impact of Property Assessment Standards on Property Tax Burden:  
An Examination of Systematic Bias in a Market Value versus  
a Non-Market Value Assessment Standard  
 
 
Abstract 
Property tax is a tax on estimated values rather than transactions—an important distinction from other 
taxes. Another distinction is that each state develops its own system for administering the property tax, 
including how properties are assessed. The consensus among scholars is that current market value 
assessment is the standard for achieving the most fair and equitable property tax burden. This study 
compares two disparate assessment standards in one urban county, analyzing potential determinants of 
systematic bias. The findings indicate that less systematic bias exists under the market value standard, but 
that the overall equity is only marginally better horizontally and tended toward a more regressive tax 
structure. A market value assessment standard may mitigate the inherent inequity (i.e., systematic bias) in 
a non-market value system. However, the inequities in the market value system, which may be less 
predictable, still must be monitored and addressed. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars generally contend that real property taxes are an appropriate mechanism for funding the 
provision of local government services (Slemrod 1995; Fisher 1996; Oates 1999, 2000; Mikesell 
2004).However, property taxes typically are not viewed favorably by the general public or political 
officials (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1989; Cole & Kincaid 2006; 
Chamberlain 2007).Much of the debate surrounding the use of property tax is because of its high visibility 
and the lack of assurance that it can be administered fairly (Seligman 1985).Taxpayers may not be 
confident that they equally share in the cost of local public services and that those costs are connected to 
their relative abilities to pay. 
The most obvious distinction between property tax and other taxes is the determination of its 
base. Property taxes are based on estimates and not transactions, which inherently leads to perceived and 
sometimes actual disparities in tax burdens. The base of the property tax is established by state specific 
assessment processes and standards. Statutory, administrative, and judicial parameters of property tax 
assessment and administration in the United States vary by state (Chicone and Geirtz 1988).Constitutional 
and organizational (e.g., International Association of Assessing Officers [IAAO]) tax standards mandate 
that the process of a true ad valorem tax (i.e., a tax proportionally levied on the value of the base) 
accurately represents property wealth so that the tax burden is fairly and equitably distributed. Most 
public finance scholars and assessing professionals agree that property wealth is most equitably and fairly 
determined through a full market value assessment standard. Under such a system, the goal is for assessed 
values to reflect market values as they change over time. That is, the system should have a process in 
place that accurately estimates values (property wealth) to fairly and equitably tax citizens. 
Several studies have shown that deviations from the full market value, such as fractional 
assessment and acquisition value assessment, lead to inequitable tax burdens (Shannon 1969; Geraci and 
Plourde 1976; Geraci 1977; Bowman and Mikesell 1978; Bowman and Butcher 1986; O’Sullivan, 
Sexton, and Sheffrin 1994; Sexton, Sheffrin, and O’Sullivan 1999; Sjoquist and Pandey 2001).An 
inequitable tax burden among residents and businesses creates an unfair tax system that potentially affects 
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a governmental unit’s ability to raise revenue. Inequitable tax burdens also may create economic 
distortions within and among taxing jurisdictions. 
 In Indiana, the assessment standard has changed from non-market value assessment to full market 
value assessment. While unique, Indiana’s previous non-market value assessment standard provides a 
base from which to judge market value assessment (Smith 2002; Mikesell 2004).1Within a quasi-
experimental setting, this analysis examines the systematic assessment bias of two disparate property tax 
assessment standards; market value and non-market value. Specifically, potential determinants of 
systematic assessment bias are estimated and comparisons are made between a standard that is 
presumably less fair (i.e., non-market value assessment) than a version of the prescribed standard (i.e., 
market value assessment). 
 The analytical framework of this study is a modification of an older theoretical theme.The 
empirical approach taken in this analysis is different than the approach taken in some of the previous 
literature on property tax assessment. Many studies on the subject examine the disparities in assessment 
based solely on uniformity among jurisdictions (Almy 1977; Geraci 1977; Bowman and Mikesell 1978, 
Lowery 1982; Bowman and Butcher 1986; Ross 2011).This study examines disparities in assessment 
based on systematic bias that may lead to lack of uniformity within a single, primarily urban, county.  
 While this analysis is a case study of one urban county and should be interpreted cautiously, the 
results illuminate at least two important points about property tax standards.  First, property tax 
assessment systems that diverge further from a market value standard can lead to inequities in a 
systematic way. Indiana’s non-market valuation standard was unique. However, the analysis presented 
here offers an example (similar to studies that examine acquisition value assessment) of how a system that 
calculatedly drives a wedge between market value and the property tax base systematically can lead to 
inequitable tax burden. Similar studies typically focus on the implementation of one type of valuation 
standard (e.g., acquisition value in California or Georgia). This study compares the implementation of two 
valuation standards in a county that was part of a statewide transition from a non-market value standard to 
a market value standard. Second, the results illustrate the importance of monitoring and evaluating 
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assessment administration even within a system that is closer to a prescribed, less systematically biased2, 
market value standard. 
 The results from the analysis of Marion County, Indiana show that a non-market value 
assessment system is not only legally inferior because of the inability to objectively verify the quality of 
assessments, but that a much larger percentage of the variation in assessment-sales ratios among 
properties assessed under that standard may be explained by determinants of systematic bias. That is, 
more of the assessment error is built into the assessment process systematically under the non-market 
value standard. However, the resulting lower percentage of variation systematically explained by the 
market-value system did not lead to large global changes in vertical and horizontal equity. Horizontal 
equity only marginally improved and a common measure of vertical equity showed greater tendency 
toward a regressive tax burden under the market value assessment. These findings shed light on a 
complex policy issue in a state that attempted to reform the assessment process to be fairer. With the 
exception of two assessing jurisdictions (i.e., townships) in the study area, the uniformity of assessment-
sales ratios did not change substantially, but the ability to understand the variations in the level of 
assessment did. Even still, the market valuation standard prevails as the better assessment system in terms 
of reduction in systematic bias associated with multiple property and location characteristics. 
 
2. Background: Property Tax Assessment Standards in Marion County, Indiana 
 
Major changes occurred in the Indiana assessment process in 2002 as a result of court-ordered 
reform. Specifically, a 1998 Indiana Supreme Court ruling in State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Town 
of St. John (1998) and subsequent rulings resulted in comprehensive changes to how the property tax base 
is assessed in Indiana. In 2002, the Indiana assessment standard changed from non-market valuation to 
one effectively based on market value for single-family residential properties. Prior to 2002, the standard 
for the assessment of real property in Indiana was defined in the Indiana Real Property Appraisal Manual 
(also known as Regulation 17) and mass reassessments were updated according to state rules. Land and 
4 
 
 
 
improvements were assessed separately.3 Land value was determined by a land value commission. 
Improvements on single-family parcels were established using a state-determined formula-based cost 
method. The true tax value of improvements was estimated using cost tables minus depreciation. State-
circulated rules were used to depreciate improvements by age and physical condition (Bennett and 
Stullich 1992). Broadly, the cost method for improvements was based on the reproduction of a home 
under the rule of state-based guidelines.  
 The court found that the old system was in direct violation of Article 10, Section 1 of the Indiana 
Constitution, “the General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of property 
assessment and taxation and shall prescribe regulations to secure a just valuation for all property, both 
real and personal.” The Indiana Constitution also declares that the state must have, “a system of 
assessment and taxation characterized by uniformity, equality, and just valuation based on property 
wealth.” The old valuation standard made it extremely difficult for property owners to understand 
whether or not their assessment was fair or equitable because there was no linkage between true tax value 
and another transparent value, like market value. There was no direct linkage to property wealth. 
Beginning in 2002, full market value became the Indiana assessment standard. The 2002 standard 
implemented in Marion County for single-family residential properties began with an estimate of 
replacement costs less depreciation. Those estimates were compared to prices of nearby, recently sold, 
properties (i.e., price comparisons). The price comparisons were used to make necessary assessed value 
adjustments, attempting to tie assessed values directly to property wealth. 
The implied purpose for changing to a system in which assessed values are more transparent was 
that property assessments would be fairer and more equitable. The new Indiana assessment standard is 
defined as, “[the property’s] current use, as reflected by the utility received by the owner or a similar user, 
from the property” (DLGF 2000: 8). The state’s assessment rules indicate that “true tax values” (i.e., 
broadly referred to as gross assessed value) can be compared to the sales price as an “objectively 
verifiable” measure (DLGF 2000: 20). That is, the true tax value should equal or approximate market 
value of single-family residential properties.  
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3. Review of Relevant Literature 
 Previous literature focuses on uniformity as a measure of performance. The unit of analysis in 
those studies is typically counties, which is the most common level of government responsible for the 
primary task of assessing property (IAAO 1999). The coefficient of dispersion often has been used to 
measure uniformity. The coefficient of dispersion is a nonparametric measure of the absolute average 
percentage deviation of the assessment-sales ratios from the jurisdictional median assessment-sales ratio. 
Those studies serve their intended purpose, which is to empirically determine whether or not the variation 
among jurisdictional coefficients of dispersion is related to assessor characteristics (e.g., appointed or 
elected) and administrative infrastructure (e.g., use of tax maps), holding other potential influences 
constant (e.g., market forces and demographics). 
 Bowman and Mikesell (1990) provide an insightful review of 40 years of literature on the subject. 
They explain that uniformity matters because it is based on the principle of equity in taxation described 
by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989). That principle posits that people with the same capacity to pay should 
be equally taxed. Bowman and Mikesell (1990) explain that the relevant test is not level of assessment 
(i.e., assessment-sales ratio), but whether or not there are barriers to assessment uniformity. In those 
studies, it does not matter whether or not a property is valued correctly or whether or not certain factors 
are related to over- or under-assessment. Their test is whether or not the characteristics of assessment 
administration are significantly related to variation in jurisdictional assessment equity of similar 
properties.  
 This study examines the relationship between relevant factors and over- or under-assessment at 
the property level by comparing two different standards of assessment. For the purposes of this study, 
identifying bias implies that the focus is on the magnitude of over- and under-assessment. The purpose of 
identifying systematic bias is to analyze whether or not potential influences on the quality of assessment 
for a certain type of residential property is systematically a result of the standard used to value the 
property. More directly, how does the assessment standard affect tax burden? 
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 One may presume that the non-market value assessment system is more likely to have stronger 
systematic biases than a market-value based system. Under the former method, adherence to the formula 
is the rule with no reference to market value. Under the latter, achieving equality between assessed value 
and market value is the goal. The results of the analysis may be used to understand the context in which 
properties’ tax burden is based on the assessment standard used. 
 Some studies have tested potential influences that may systematically affect assessment ratios 
(Berry and Bednarz 1975; Lowery 1982; Ihlanfeldt and Jackson 1982; Haurin 1988; Goolsby 1997; 
Strauss and Strauss 2004; Ross 2011). Lowery (1982) modeled several factors hypothesized to affect the 
level of assessment (i.e., assessment-sales ratio). Lowery’s use of assessment level (i.e., Assessed 
Value/Sale Price) as a dependent variable was a result of data availability, not a deliberate focus on 
systematic bias. The purpose of the Lowery (1982) study was based on continuing efforts to determine if 
assessor characteristics and administrative infrastructure affected the uniformity of assessment. Similarly, 
Ross (2011) used the level of assessment as the dependent variable to estimate the relationship between 
potential political pressures on assessors and tax burden.  
 Like Berry and Bednarz (1975) and Goolsby (1997), this study is less focused on potential 
political cue-taking by assessors and more on systematic over- and under-assessment of certain property, 
neighborhood, and location characteristics. This study also compares results of two distinct assessment 
standards. Variations of assessment-sales ratios may be the result of three broad influences (Berry & 
Bednarz, 1975: 23): 
1. Factors that influence assessors to adjust values that are not related to market value; 
 
2. Factors that affect the market, but are not acknowledged properly by assessors; and 
 
3. Factors that are valued differently by assessors and the market. 
 
 Potential influences, represented by independent variables in an econometric model, should not 
have high levels of explanatory power because those influences should equally affect the numerator and 
denominator (Berry and Bednarz 1975; Goolsby 1997). That is, those influences should affect the 
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assessed value and sale price equally. The more variance explained by potential influences of these 
characteristics under each system, the more the system leads to inherent systematic bias.  
 This study focuses on two systems using data points (i.e., parcels) as the units of analysis. 
Analyzing systematic bias in a county that changed its assessment practices from a non-market value 
standard (reproduction cost) to a standard that is driven by market values in search of fairness is a unique 
opportunity. This study is not focused on assessors’ qualities and their ability to reduce the disparity 
between comparable properties, but on how tax burden is or is not affected by systems with or without 
inherent biases built into the valuation standard.  
 
4. Data and Descriptive Analyses 
Marion County (primarily Indianapolis), Indiana, serves as an ideal case for this analysis. Marion 
County contains an adequate amount of social diversity and diversity in housing stock. Also, it was part 
of a 2002 state-level assessment reform that required mass assessment adjustment of all properties in the 
county under a different assessment system. The change occurred for all properties at the same time, 
which allows the impact of assessment changes on property tax burden to be tested under what effectively 
may be considered a quasi-experimental design.  
The primary data sources for this analysis come from a Multiple Listing Service (MLS) provided 
by the Metropolitan Indianapolis Board of REALTORS® (MIBOR) and parcel level data provided by the 
Marion County Assessor’s Office. All single-family residential listings recorded in the MIBOR MLS 
from 1999 to present are accessible. That proprietary database includes approximately 200 potential 
variables, including fairly complete sales prices, unit characteristics (e.g., age, square footage, property 
acreage), and location attributes (e.g., location coordinates, township, parcel identification). MIBOR 
estimates that approximately 80 percent of all properties sold in their service area during the study period 
are listed in the MLS database. 
Parcel level assessment data from the township assessors includes all residential parcels for 
assessment years 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2005, with fields for parcel identification, property type 
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identification, and gross assessed value.4 The data straddle the 2002 assessment reform that occurred in 
Indiana and led to a switch in assessment practices from a non-market value assessment standard to a 
market value assessment standard. The two primary data sources are merged by a parcel identification 
number. Other necessary neighborhood characteristics are obtained from publicly accessible secondary 
sources (e.g., Bureau of the Census) and spatially joined through the use of a geographic information 
system.  
The data are separated into two subsamples, NON-MARKET and MARKET. The NON-
MARKET sample allows for analysis of assessment equity prior to assessment reform in Marion County, 
Indiana. The MARKET sample allows for analysis of assessment equity in the same county after 
assessment reform. Each property’s most recent, prior assessment was used in the analysis. 
The data are cleansed of obvious data entry errors, non-arm’s length transactions, vacant parcels, 
and properties on which improvements had not been assessed (property assessment typically lags new 
construction by approximately two years)5. The resulting dataset includes 35,432 observations across all 
years studied. Table 1 shows the number of observations for each year studied by township. Townships 
were the primary unit of government responsible for property tax assessment during the study period. The 
number of observations each year ranges from 8,148 to 9,344 for the entire county. 
 Table 2 summarizes the typical measures used to analyze level of assessment, horizontal equity, 
and vertical equity. The level of assessment is measured by the jurisdictional median assessment-sales 
ratio. Horizontal equity is measured by the coefficient of dispersion (COD), and vertical equity is 
measured by the price-related differential (PRD).  
 The county-wide median ratios for the NON-MARKET sample were 0.52 each year. The annual 
county medians of the MARKET sample were 0.88 and 0.85. Median assessment-sales ratios across 
townships during years before assessment reform range from 0.38 (Washington Township, AY2001) to 
0.60 (Pike Township, AY2000), a 74 percent difference.  
 After assessment reform to the market value standard, the township values range from 0.76 
(Washington Township, AY2005) to 0.97 (Decatur Township, AY2004), a 28 percent difference. Annual 
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comparisons are fairly consistent for each township before and after assessment reform. Only two 
townships (Decatur and Franklin) meet the 0.90 to 1.10 IAAO standard of acceptability in both 
assessment years after assessment reform. Two additional townships (Pike and Warren) meet the standard 
in the first year reported after assessment reform. As expected in an assessment system with no reference 
to market value, none of the township assessed values prior to assessment reform are near that standard. 
That finding illustrates the lack of transparency in formula-based, non-market driven assessments. 
Generally, the variation in level of assessment (median jurisdictional A/S) shows inter-jurisdictional 
differences that ultimately may lead to unfair tax distribution when taxing districts overlap multiple 
townships.  
 The overall COD for Marion County does not meet the IAAO’s standard, which states that the 
COD should be within 10 to 15 percent of the median A/S value. The slightly lower COD values show 
that the market value system is only marginally more uniform than the non-market value system. The 
most common measure for vertical equity, PRD, shows inconsistency in levels of vertical inequity. Lower 
priced homes were generally over-assessed relative to higher priced homes in both samples (PRD>1.0), 
with the exception of one township (Perry Township). This result indicates regressivity in both systems. 
County PRD measures are above the IAAO standard (0.98-1.03) in both samples, though the MARKET 
sample PRD indicates that higher priced properties were under-assessed to a greater extent following 
assessment reform. The following sections explain the methodological approach and results of seeking 
whether or not the disparities found through the previous descriptive analyses is likely due to systematic 
error inherent in the standards. 
5. Estimating Systematic Bias Under Two Disparate Assessment Standards 
 The test for systematic bias in both valuation methods is operationalized by regressing potential 
influences on the assessment-sales ratios in both samples, NON-MARKET and MARKET. The selection 
of potential influences is guided by the few studies addressing systematic bias and the assessment 
uniformity literature, though several adaptations were necessary to fit the purposes of this study and the 
units of analysis used. Theoretical and empirical inferences from previous literature suggest that housing 
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characteristics and neighborhood characteristics may influence assessment errors. Other influences may 
be related to assessor characteristics and time of sale. Equation 1 illustrates those relationships. 
    A/S = β0 + βkSk + βjLj + βhRh+ βgTg + e   (1) 
  Where: 
   A/S= a vector of assessment-sales ratios 
   Sk = vector of property characteristics 
   Lj = vector of locational characteristics 
   Rh= vector of jurisdiction variables 
   Tg= Time 
   β0, βk, βj, βh, and βg = corresponding parameters 
   e = vector of errors 
 
 Like previous studies on assessment uniformity, a semi-log model is used (Bowman and Mikesell 
1978, Bowman and Butcher 1986). The natural log transformation of the dependent variable is justified to 
reduce heteroskedasticity that is associated with highly-skewed values.6 That transformation also is 
theoretically appropriate given that the marginal effects of the determinants are likely relative to the 
observed level of assessment for each observation. 
 Table 3 summarizes the determinants expected to systematically affect assessment accuracy. As 
mentioned previously, the log transformed assessment level is the dependent variable. Property 
characteristics include the square feet of unimproved land, proportion of the parcel that is unimproved, 
age of the property, and square feet. Unimproved land is assessed separately in both assessment systems 
as if the land had no improvements. It is difficult to foretell the expected sign of the two unimproved land 
variables. One of those variables (Sqft Unimproved Area) addresses the potential effect of the absolute 
size of land on the parcel. The other (Proportion Parcel Unimproved) addresses the amount of land 
relative to the footprint of the house. It is reasonable to assume that valuation of land without 
improvements is difficult and may lead to bias in the assessment-sales ratio. If land value is under-
assessed, then capital improvements will be overly taxed. Bias associated with land could lead to 
distortions in the land-capital mix (Berry and Bednarz 1975) 
 Property age likely is an important determinant. Mikesell (2004) found that the non-market 
assessment process, relying heavily upon depreciation tables with no reference to market conditions, 
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generally led to bias. With more weight on depreciation than the market, Mikesell (2004) found that older 
homes were more likely to be under-assessed. In a market-value driven assessment system, the age factor 
may be expected to be less correlated with assessment-sales ratios. Other scholars who have tested the 
effect of housing unit age on systematic assessment bias using the assessment-sales ratio as a dependent 
variable found that even assessors operating under market-driven standards tend to under value older 
properties. That is, assessors tend to depreciate the improved value of a property more rapidly than 
homebuyers (Berry and Bednarz 1975; Goolsby 1997). 
 The total square feet of a residential house also may affect the assessment-sales ratio 
systematically. Whether assessed values are based on reproduction costs (NON-MARKET) or 
replacement costs (MARKET VALUE), it is possible that those values and market values for square 
footage are not equal (Berry and Bednarz 1975; Goolsby 1997). It is difficult to determine a priori 
whether or not one should expect a different, or larger, effect under one valuation standard versus the 
other.  
  Neighborhood characteristics in the model include the proportion of non-white residents, median 
neighborhood household income, proportion of housing structures rented, proportion of non-seasonal 
vacant properties that are not listed for rent or sale, and the proportions of older and newer units in the 
census tract in which each observation is located. Several previous studies have tested the effect of race 
and income on assessment quality (Black 1972; Berry and Bednarz 1975; Schroeder &Sjoquist 1976; 
Almy 1977; Ihlanfeldt and Jackson 1982; Haurin 1988; Goolsby 1997; Strauss and Strauss 2004). 
Empirically, those studies have found that race and income matter.  
 Researchers generally have concluded that the dominance of non-white residents is related to 
over-assessment or lack of uniformity in assessment. One line of reasoning is that assessors make 
prejudicial judgments against geographic concentrations of minority residents. Over-assessment in 
neighborhoods with higher proportion of non-white residents also may be a product of the valuation 
standard, types of housing occupied by the non-white residents, and the nature of the housing market 
(Strauss and Strauss 2004). 
12 
 
 
 
 Correlation between assessment error and the presence of vacant properties also has been 
empirically found. Jurisdictions with greater concentrations of vacant properties have been found to be 
less uniform (Bowman and Butcher 1986; Bowman and Mikesell 1978; Bowman and Mikesell 1990). 
Systematically biased assessments might be expected as the proportion of nearby single-family vacancies 
increase. One may expect vacant properties to have a greater negative effect on market values than on 
assessed values because assessors may not adequately value negative externalities. A non-market based 
assessment may more likely be related to bias since the effect of those externalities has no relevance.  
 Some scholars have suggested lack of assessment uniformity may be associated with lower 
income neighborhoods because lower income residents are less likely to have political clout (Bowman 
and Mikesell 1978; Bowman and Mikesell 1990). In Indiana, the assessor is an elected position. 
Researchers have empirically found that elected assessors’ jurisdictions are less uniform than appointed 
assessors’ jurisdictions (Bowman and Mikesell 1978; Bowman and Mikesell 1990; Ross 2011). The 
rational conclusion is that the lack of uniformity is biased toward over-assessment. If neighborhoods with 
concentrations of lower income residents are over-assessed relative to higher income residents, then one 
may conclude that the administration of the tax has led to a regressive tax base. As with over-assessment 
associated with the proportion of non-white population, over-assessment in lower income neighborhoods 
also may be a product of the valuation standard, types of housing occupied by lower income residents, 
and the nature of the housing market. 
 Market heterogeneity also is expected to affect assessment levels, ceteris paribus. Several studies 
have tested different measures of market heterogeneity, including age and sales price heterogeneity 
(Schroeder and Sjoquist 1976; Bowman and Butcher 1986; Chicoine and Geirtz 1988). Relative 
neighborhood heterogeneity is tested in this study by categorizing various properties into aggregated age 
cohorts reported in the 2000 Decennial Census (US Census Bureau 2004). Specifically, the proportion of 
structures in a census tract is calculated for the following age cohorts: before 1940; 1940 to 1969; 1970 
to1990; and 1990 to 1999.  
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 The proportion of units outside of each observation’s cohort was calculated. The variable, 
Proportion Older, is the proportion of properties within each observation’s Census Tract that were built 
in prior age cohorts. Proportion Newer is the proportion of units built after each observation’s cohort. 
Together, those variables provide a measure of relative property heterogeneity in the neighborhood of 
each observation. In effect, Proportion Older and Proportion Newer measure the relative age of each 
observation to other properties in the neighborhood. If a higher proportion of properties are within the 
same cohort as the observation, one may expect less systematic bias. Tested separately, potential 
variations between older and newer concentrations of properties and the observations may be examined. 
The direction and magnitude may differ between by proportions of properties built in older or newer 
cohorts. 
 Frequency of surrounding sales may be an important influence of systematic bias in different 
ways (McMillenand Weber 2008). Properties in thicker rather than thinner markets may be valued with 
less error if assessed values are influenced by market value. However, greater frequency of sales 
surrounding a property may be an indication of demand in the surrounding neighborhood and may be 
expected to have a positive relationship with house price that is not reflected in an assessor’s valuation. 
The frequency of sales is calculated by counting the number of sales that occurred within a one-mile 
radius around the property in both samples. The use of a one-mile radius was chosen from preliminary 
analyses on the effect of frequency on property sales price.  
 Township and year variables account for potential unobservable effects. The township location of 
the each parcel was identified in the assessment records. Townships envelop location effects. As the 
jurisdiction with primary responsibility of assessment, townships include unobservable effects of 
assessment administration. They also account for differential market effects on price that may not be 
reflected in assessed values.7 Townships’ estimates will indicate whether or not there is a differential 
effect among township assessments holding other property and neighborhood characteristics constant.  
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 The binary Year variable adjusts the intercept for time. The base year is the first year in each 
sample. The base year is the omitted variable for each model and the subsequent year is reported as a 
differential coefficient from that base year.  
 Table 4 shows the mean and standard deviation for each of the variables used to examine 
systematic bias in each sample. The MARKET and NON-MARKET samples contain 17,036 and 18,396 
observations, respectively. As with any study using sales prices as a proxy for market values, there is 
potential for sample selection bias (Gatzlaff and Haurin 1998). That is, the properties sold during the 
study period may not be representative of all single-family residential properties in the study area (Allen 
and Dare 2002). Data limitations prevent identifying the direction of the potential bias associated with 
sample selection. However, examination of the means and standard deviations of the two time periods 
considered in this study show that the samples are generally comparable across property and 
neighborhood characteristics. The distributions across townships and years sold also are similar. The 
greatest differences are between A/S, and the Nominal Tax Rate variable. 
 The MARKET sample A/S mean is 73 percent higher than the NON-MARKET sample mean. 
This is the result of a shift in all assessments. The shift does not translate into an average 73 percent 
increase in effective tax rate. All properties’ A/S shifted as a result of assessment reform. The variation 
around the mean A/S for each sample is comparable. One standard deviation is (+/-) 34 percent and (+/-) 
31 percent of the mean for the NON-MARKET and MARKET samples, respectively. The dependent 
variable, A/S, is transformed to its natural log. Therefore, the results can be interpreted proportionally. 
That is, the effect of one unit change in each independent variable on A/S is interpreted as the marginal 
percentage change.  
 The shift in nominal tax rate reflects the shift from what was essentially a fractional assessment 
standard to one in which the goal is full market value. The mean nominal tax rate of the MARKET 
sample is just over one-third the same rate in the NON-MARKET sample. Like the variation around the 
mean A/S, the variation around the mean nominal tax rate for each sample is comparable. One standard 
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deviation is (+/-) 11 percent and (+/-) 9 percent of the mean for the NON-MARKET and MARKET 
samples, respectively. 
 
6. Results 
Table 5 shows the OLS results of the NON-MARKET and MARKET models. The models 
explain 35 percent of the variance in the NON-MARKET sample and 12.5 percent of the variance in 
MARKET sample. These findings raise issues that continually will be difficult to address. First, the 
uniformity of assessment-sales ratios is only slightly better after assessment reform (See table 2). The 
coefficients of dispersion in Table 2 indicate that the average distribution of assessment-sales ratios from 
the global median (county median) is between 21 percent and 28 percent for each of the assessment years 
studied—a difference of seven percentage points—and both well above the IAAO acceptable equity 
standard. On the other hand, systematic variation explained by the ln(A/S) models for the samples is quite 
different. The variance explained by the model of non-market value assessments (R2=0.35) is nearly three 
times greater than the variance explained by the model of market value assessments (R2=0.13). Therefore, 
the market value system may have less built-in bias, but is only slightly more uniform as a whole; based 
more heavily upon unexplained variation.8 Secondly, some systematic bias still remains in the newer, 
presumably fairer, market-based assessment process. Further examination of the models indicates that 
many of the variables that are significant in the NON-MARKET sample are also significant in the 
MARKET sample.  
The coefficients may be multiplied by 100 to represent marginal percentage change in A/S for a 
one unit increase in each independent variable. Two of the five property determinants were significantly 
related to assessment-sales ratio before assessment reform at p<0.05. Significant unimproved land size 
effects exist in both samples. The land effect in the NON-MARKET sample is proportional, relative to the 
footprint of the housing structure on the parcel. The land effect in the MARKET sample is on the absolute 
size of the unimproved portion of the parcel. After assessment reform to the market value standard, five 
of the same seven neighborhood determinants had a significant effect on ln(A/S) at p<0.05. The 
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proportion non-white population, proportion vacant, proportion built before, frequency of sales, and 
nominal tax rate all have the same directional effects (though there is a difference in magnitude between 
the two samples) on ln(A/S). One variable, proportion of neighborhood properties in the cohort built after 
each observation, was not significant at p<0.05 in the NON-MARKET sample and significant at p<0.05 
in the MARKET sample. The results show significant location (i.e., townships) and sales year (Yeart+1) 
effects in both samples.  
Generally, tax burdens decrease significantly before and after assessment reform as structure age, 
square feet of living area, frequency of sales in the neighborhood, and nominal tax rate increase. The 
negative relationship between structure age and ln(A/S) is linear after switching to market value 
assessment, but it is exponentially related before assessment reform. Tax burdens increase significantly 
before and after assessment reform as the proportion non-white population and proportion vacant 
structures increases. The binary township variables show some variation between the assessment 
jurisdictions. All townships’ coefficients are referenced to Center Township, since it is the omitted 
variable. 
  
7. Summary and Discussion 
 The estimates presented in table 5 can be compared graphically to illustrate the magnitude of bias 
associated with various property and neighborhood attributes. Four property characteristics and two 
neighborhood characteristics are chosen for further investigation, including: Structure Age, Sqft 
Unimproved Area, Proportion Parcel Unimproved, Sq ft Living Area, Proportion Non-white, and 
Proportion Vacant. Each graphic illustrates the magnitude of the coefficients. 
 The graphs should be viewed cautiously. They are for illustrative purposes only because the 
average house does not exist.9The graphs compare the magnitude of each factor between two separate 
samples and models. They reflect the disparity that exists by manipulating each attribute, while holding 
all other attributes constant. The illustrations represent the approximate middle 80 percent (the bottom 
and top 10 percent of properties for each variable were trimmed for each graphic) of the data for each 
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variable. Solid lines indicate that the estimated effect is significant and the dashed lines indicate that the 
effect is statistically insignificant at p<0.05. 
 The marginal effect of attribute change displayed in the following figures is based on the 
percentage difference from the median county level of assessment. This adjustment allows for a 
comparison of the two samples on similar scales. Table 6 shows the median and average assessment-sales 
ratios for each sample. That table also shows the percentage difference of the average property A/S ratio 
from the median A/S.As indicated, the NON-MARKET sample mean A/S is 53.11, which is 1.7 percent 
higher than the sample median 52.20. The MARKET sample mean (92.37) is 6.8 percent higher than the 
sample median 86.44. 
 
7.1 Property Specific Bias 
 Figure1 through figure 4 illustrate the relationship of the property specific variables separately, 
holding all other factors constant. Figure 1 compares the magnitude of property age bias under both 
assessment processes. The Structure Age variable has been transformed to the year the structures were 
built. That figure shows a much greater disparity associated with property age prior to Indiana’s transition 
to market value assessment. 
 Specifically, Figure 1 shows the average house (varying only in age) built after 2000 has an 
estimated A/S ratio that is over 40 percent higher than the sample median before assessment reform to the 
market value standard. That same house built prior to 1940 has an expected A/S ratio that is more than 15 
percent below the same sample (NONMARKET) median. There was substantially more burden for newer 
properties under the non-market value assessment standard. These results are similar to Mikesell’s (2004) 
findings across many counties in his study of non-market value assessment in Indiana. The estimated age 
disparity after switching to the market value assessment standard ranges from greater than10 percent 
below to less than 10 percent above the median for homes built between 1920 and 2005.Comparisons of 
the two samples illustrate the substantial tax burden shifts between property owners of newer homes to 
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property owners with older homes as result of reform from non-market value assessment to market value 
assessment. 
 The bias associated with square feet of living area before and after assessment reform is shown in 
figure 2.Specifically, that figure shows both standards place greater tax burden on smaller homes than 
larger homes. That is, homebuyers seem to place slightly more value than assessors on the size of the 
house. However, the magnitude of the bias associated with house size is negligible in both samples. 
 Figure 3 and figure 4 illustrate the comparison A/S bias as a result of the amount of unimproved 
land on a parcel before and after assessment reform. The market value standard, as administered during 
the study period, tended to place a subsidy on land, introducing greater tax burden on improvements 
(holding all other factors constant, including house size).The subsidy placed on land after assessment 
reform (as illustrated by figure 4) may distort the land-capital mix (Berry and Bednarz, 1975).Over-
assessment of land may reduce the intensiveness of land use and reduce capital investment. The 
proportion of unimproved land before assessment reform was positive and significant, but the magnitude 
of that effect is trivial.  
 
7.2 Neighborhood Bias 
 Figure5 and figure 6 show the direct effect of selected neighborhood variables separately, holding 
all other factors constant. Figure 5 compares the magnitude of bias associated with the proportion non-
white population under both assessment standards. The administration of both systems led to the over-
assessment of residential properties in neighborhoods with higher proportions of non-white residents. The 
disparity of tax burden between higher and lower neighborhood concentrations of non-white residents due 
to assessment bias is smaller under the market value standard. This illustrates an unintended consequence 
of an assessment standard that is not related to market value (NON-MARKET sample). 
 As shown in figure 6, the proportion of vacancies in a neighborhood creates greater disparities in 
the non-market based assessment. This finding may be expected. The market-driven assessment should 
better account for the externalities associated with distressed neighborhoods. This is an important finding 
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as one considers the effect of private decisions and public consequences. The decision of private home 
owners to abandon a property likely affects the property value of surrounding residents. A tax system that 
does not consider this type of externality increases the negative effect of such decisions by over taxing 
homeowners in neighborhoods with more distressed properties. 
  
7.3 General Policy Implications 
 The property tax will likely continue to be a major local government revenue source in the United 
States despite the public perception that it is inherently unfair and political pressure to eliminate its use 
(Jensen 1931; Aaron 1975; Case 1978; Almy 1982).However, historical patterns indicate that political 
pressure may continue to place limits on its use or alter how it is administered. The findings presented 
here have implications for property tax policy in the context of such pressures. 
 State laws and standards that result in property tax assessments that diverge from market value 
can directly affect fairness and equity of tax burden. The findings of this and other studies (Bowman and 
Butcher 1986; Bowman and Mikesell 1990; O’Sullivan et al. 1994; Sexton et al. 1999) show that 
standards other than full market value can lead to unintended consequences. Indiana’s non-market value 
assessment system, while unique, provides a base from which to judge market-value assessment 
standards. The determination of assessed values under the non-market value system in Marion County, 
Indiana was driven by the age of properties. The unintended consequence was that owners of newer 
properties paid higher effective tax rates than owners of older properties, ceteris paribus. No single 
dominant determinant systematically affected the level of assessment under the market value standard like 
age of property under the non-market value standard. 
 State regulatory bodies and legislators should recognize that the market value standard alone does 
not guarantee equitable property tax burden. Quality administration of the standard is critical, especially 
in terms of the efficiency of the property tax. The findings in this study show that the market value 
assessment standard in the area studied led to global inequity that was nearly equal to the systematic 
inequity experienced under the non-market assessment system. This underscores the fact that while 
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systematic bias in an assessment system is inherently inequitable, unexplained assessment error that is 
associated with poor assessment performance may still exist. The focus should be on addressing that 
unexplained assessment error. 
 
1Two previous studies have examined the equity impact of Indiana’s non-market valuation standard. 
Smith (2000) examined typical vertical equity measures in Bloomington, Indiana. Evidence from Smith’s 
analysis suggests that the non-market valuation standard employed in that city resulted in a progressive 
property tax structure. Smith cautioned that his findings may be limited and further examination of the 
relationship between assessment equity and property characteristics (e.g., location, age of structure, and 
demographic characteristics) may be beneficial for understanding valuation standards that do not attempt 
to objectively reflect property wealth. Mikesell’s (2004) interjursidictional (i.e., aggregate county equity 
measures) study of Indiana’s non-market valuation standard found considerable equity discrepancies 
across counties. Examination of Indiana county level measures used by Mikesell does not show a 
consistent pattern suggesting that the inequity associated with the non-market valuation standard was an 
artifact of urban versus rural property location.  
2 Less systematic bias is referring to the difficulty of identifying dominant determinants of assessment 
bias. 
3 Improvements are constructed features added to the land (e.g., buildings, sheds, pools). 
4 Electronically formatted data were not available to the author for 2002 or 2003. 
5 Indiana assessments are separated by improvement assessed value and land assessed value. New 
construction (i.e., new improvements) is not assessed immediately after construction. Typically, new 
construction is assigned a relatively low improvement assessed value (e.g., $200).  This indicates that 
there have been new improvements, but the improvements have not been assessed.  Examination of the 
data shows an approximate two year period between new construction and assessment of improvements. 
6 Initial models were estimated without the log transformation. The results empirically indicated a 
significant problem with heteroskedasticity. 
7 Preliminary models included tax intensity variables by township, which were consistently insignificant. 
Once it was clear those observed measures (e.g., proportion of residential assessed value) had no effect, 
binary location variables were tested to see if unobserved effects within townships had an effect 
(Bowman and Mikesell 1990; Bowman & Butcher 1986). 
8At the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, additional models excluding time invariant neighborhood 
characteristics extracted from the 2000 Biennial Census were tested. The purpose of those models is to 
examine the robustness of conclusions drawn from the differences in explained variation. The variation 
explained by the models dropped from 34.9 percent to 25.1 percent for the non-market valuation model 
and from 12.5 percent to 9.5 percent for the market valuation model. Even after the exclusion of Census 
extracted variables, the variation explained was over two times greater for the non-market value model 
than for the market value model. 
9 For instance, no property can be located proportionally across all townships. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Sample Size by Year and Township 
 
SAMPLE SIZE 
(Proportion of Sample) 
TOWNSHIPS 
NON-MARKET MARKET 
AY 2000 AY 2001 AY2004 AY2005 
Center 1,246 (15.3%)  
1,300 
(14.6%)  
1,191 
(12.7%)  
 1,208 
(13.3%)  
Decatur 206  (2.5%) 
231  
(2.6%) 
277 
(3.0%) 
228  
(2.5%) 
Franklin 380 (4.7%) 
393  
(4.4%) 
 583 
(6.2%) 
507  
(5.6%) 
Lawrence 1,207  (14.8%) 
1,356 
(15.3%) 
1,328 
(14.2%) 
1,322 
(14.6%) 
Perry 798 (9.8%) 
874  
(9.8%) 
1,027 
(11.0%) 
981 
(10.8%) 
Pike 843 (10.3%)  
969 
(10.9%)  
1,004  
(10.7%) 
982  
(10.8%) 
Warren 1,050 (12.9%) 
1,080 
(12.2%)  
1,170 
(12.5%)  
1,049 
(11.6%)  
Washington 1,260  (15.5%) 
1,358 
(15.3%)  
1,424 
(15.2%)  
1,517 
(16.8%) 
Wayne 1,158 (14.2%) 
1,327 
(14.9%) 
1,340 
(14.3%)  
1,258 
(13.9%) 
Marion County  8,148  (100%) 
8,888 
(100%)  
9,344 
(100%) 
9,052 
(100%) 
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Table 2: Level of Assessment, Horizontal Equity, and Vertical Equity 
Level of Assessment (Median Assessment Ratio) 
TOWNSHIPS 
NON-MARKET MARKET 
AY 2000 AY 2001 AY2004 AY2005 
Center 0.43 0.41 0.83 0.78 
Decatur 0.56 0.58 0.97 0.92 
Franklin 0.55 0.55 0.93 0.92 
Lawrence 0.57 0.56 0.86 0.84 
Perry 0.49 0.51 0.89 0.86 
Pike 0.60 0.59 0.91 0.88 
Warren 0.51 0.50 0.92 0.87 
Washington 0.42 0.38 0.77 0.76 
Wayne 0.51 0.52 0.91 0.86 
Marion County 0.52 0.52 0.88 0.85 
Horizontal Equity (Coefficient of Dispersion) 
TOWNSHIPS 
NON-MARKET MARKET 
AY 2000 AY 2001 AY2004 AY2005 
Center 0.58 0.67 0.63 0.58 
Decatur 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.14 
Franklin 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 
Lawrence 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 
Perry 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.12 
Pike 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09 
Warren 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.17 
Washington 0.30 0.34 0.19 0.18 
Wayne 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.23 
Marion County 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.21 
Vertical Equity (Price-Relate Differential) 
TOWNSHIPS 
NON-MARKET MARKET 
AY 2000 AY 2001 AY2004 AY2005 
Center 1.42 1.48 1.45 1.38 
Decatur 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 
Franklin 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.02 
Lawrence 1.02 1.03 1.07 1.04 
Perry 0.98 0.99 1.02 1.02 
Pike 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.02 
Warren 1.02 1.02 1.05 1.04 
Washington 1.07 1.10 1.06 1.06 
Wayne 1.03 1.05 1.11 1.08 
Marion County 1.06 1.08 1.12 1.09 
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Table 3: Description of Variables in Econometric Models of Systematic Bias 
Variable Description 
A/S 
Total Gross Assessed Value (Land +Improvements)/Sale 
Price -sales ratio in assessment year 
Sqft Unimproved Area  Total square feet of unimproved land 
Proportion Parcel 
Unimproved Proportion of land that is unimproved 
Structure Age Age of property at time of sale in years 
Square Feet Total square feet of property at time of sale 
Proportion Non-white 
Proportion of non-white population in Census tract in 
which the property is located (Census 2000) 
Median Neighborhood 
Income 
Median household income in Census tract in which the 
property is located (Census 2000) 
Proportion Vacant 
Proportion of vacant units in Census tract in which the 
property is located (Census 2000) 
Proportion Built Before 
(Cohort) 
Proportion of units in age cohorts before the cohort of 
each observation in Census tract in which the property is 
located (Census 2000) 
Proportion Built After 
(Cohort) 
Proportion of units in age cohorts after the cohort of each 
observation in Census tract in which the property is 
located (Census 2000) 
Frequency of Sales 
Number of sales within a 1 mile radius of each 
observation during the previous year of sale 
Nominal Tax Ratet-1 
Nominal tax rate of the district in which property was 
sold prior to the base year 
Center Township Binary variable; 1 if in Center Township, 0 else. 
Decatur Township Binary variable; 1 if in Decatur Township, 0 else. 
Franklin Township Binary variable; 1 if in Franklin Township, 0 else. 
Lawrence Township Binary variable; 1 if in Lawrence Township, 0 else. 
Perry Township Binary variable; 1 if in Perry Township, 0 else. 
Pike Township Binary variable; 1 if in Pike Township, 0 else. 
Warren Township Binary variable; 1 if in Warren Township, 0 else. 
Washington Township Binary variable; 1 if in Washington Township, 0 else. 
Wayne Township Binary variable; 1 if in the Wayne Township, 0 else. 
Year t+1 
Binary variable; 1 if property sold in sample secondyear 
of assessment April-March, 0 else. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics in Econometric Models of Systematic Bias 
VARIABLES 
NON-
MARKETN=17,036 MARKETN=18,396 
 
Mean 
(St. Dev) 
Mean 
(St. Dev) 
A/S 
53.11 
(22.26) 
92.37 
(36.42) 
Sqft Unimproved Area (10,000) 
1.29 
(1.53) 
1.31 
(1.73) 
Proportion Parcel Unimproved 
87.05 
(6.12) 
86.89 
(6.21) 
Structure Age 
39.76 
(27.09) 
40.74 
(28.13) 
Square Feet (100) 
19.48 
(9.27) 
20.09 
(9.86) 
Proportion Non-white 
24.93 
(26.27) 
23.52 
(25.43) 
Median Neighborhood Income ($1,000) 
$49.97 
(20.42) 
$51.23 
(20.66) 
Proportion Vacant 
5.38 
(5.60) 
5.14 
(5.36) 
Proportion Built Before (Cohort) 
18.06 
(23.93) 
21.16 
(26.06) 
Proportion Built After (Cohort) 
26.53 
(25.92) 
24.32 
(26.00) 
Frequency of Sales 
228.10 
(119.12) 
240.89 
(133.20) 
Nominal Tax Ratet-1 
9.04 
(1.02) 
3.27 
(0.30) 
Center Township 
0.15 
(0.36 
0.13 
(0.34) 
Decatur Township 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
Franklin Township 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
Lawrence Township 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
Perry Township 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
Pike Township 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
Warren Township 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
Washington Township 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
Wayne Township 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
Year t+1 
0.52 
(0..50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
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Table 5: OLS Estimates of Systematic Bias in Assessment Sales 
Ratio 
 
Variables 
NON-
MARKETn=17,036 MARKETn=18,396 
ln(A/S) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err) 
ln(A/S)Coefficient 
(Std. Err) 
Pr
op
er
ty
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
SqftUnimproved Area 
(10,000) 
-0.00059 
(0.00187) 
-0.01119 
(0.00149)a 
Proportion Parcel 
Unimproved 
0.00233 
(0.00063)a 
0.00030 
(0.00055) 
Structure Age 
-0.00874 
(0.00054)a 
-0.00201 
(0.00042)a 
(Structure Age)2 
0.00003 
(0.00001)a 
0.000005 
(0.000004) 
Square Ft. Living Area 
(100) 
-0.00135 
(0.00035)a 
-0.00202 
(0.00026)a 
N
ei
gh
bo
rh
oo
d 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Proportion Nonwhite 
0.00422 
(0.00016)a 
0.00180 
(0.00015)a 
Median Income (1,000) 
-0.00003 
(0.00017) 
-0.00016 
(0.00014) 
Proportion Vacant 
Structures 
0.01059 
(0.00092)a 
0.00571 
(0.00088)a 
Proportion Before Cohort 
-0.00041 
(0.00013)a 
0.00018 
(0.00011)a 
Proportion After Cohort 
-0.00021 
(0.00013)c 
0.00029 
(0.00012)a 
Frequency of Sale 
-0.00013 
(0.00003)a 
-0.00011 
(0.00002)a 
Nominal Tax Rate t-1 
-0.06217 
(0.00391)a 
-0.03262 
(0.01204)a 
To
w
ns
hi
p 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 (C
en
te
r O
m
itt
ed
) 
Decatur 
-0.00468 
(0.01646) 
0.04789 
(0.01606)a 
Franklin 
-0.03307 
(0.01422)b 
0.06806 
(0.01474)a 
Lawrence 
-0.04644 
(0.01379)a 
-0.05061 
(0.01368)a 
Perry 
-0.01949 
(0.01304) 
0.01139 
(0.01288) 
Pike 
-0.14791 
(0.01477)a 
-0.04374 
(0.01468)a 
Warren 
-0.03563 
(0.01233)a 
0.01870 
(0.01275) 
Washington 
-0.24925 
(0.01366)a 
-0.10742 
(0.01347)a 
Wayne 
-0.04095 
(0.01416)a 
0.03903 
(0.01435)a 
 
Yeart+1 
-0.01155 
(0.00459)b 
-0.05590 
(0.00420)a 
 
_cons 
4.52212 
(0.06691)a 
4.67414 
(0.06601)a 
 R2 0.3486 0.1254 
ap<=0.01; bp<=0.05; cp<=0.10 
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Table 6: Sample Mean, Median, and Percentage Differential 
  NON-MARKET Market 
Mean A/S 53.11 92.37 
Median A/S 52.20 86.44 
Percentage Differential  1.7% 6.8% 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Estimated Bias and Age of Housing Unit 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated Bias and Housing Unit Size 
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Figure 3: Estimated Bias and Sq. Ft. Unimproved Land 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated Bias and Proportion Unimproved Land 
 
 
 
 
 
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
5.
0
6.
0
7.
0
8.
0
9.
0
10
.0
11
.0
12
.0
13
.0
14
.0
15
.0
16
.0
17
.0
18
.0
19
.0
20
.0
21
.0
22
.0
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 fr
om
 M
ed
ia
n 
A
/S
Sq. Ft. Unimproved Land Area (1,000)
NON-MARKET MARKET
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 fr
om
 M
ed
ia
n 
A
/S
Proportion Land Area Unimproved
NON-MARKET MARKET
33 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Estimated Bias and Non-White Population 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Estimated Bias and Vacant Units 
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